No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering ‘Woman’

Autor(en)

Robin McKenna

Abstrakt

In a recent article in this journal, Mona Simion argues that Sally Haslanger's "engineering" approach to gender concepts such as 'woman' faces an epistemic objection. The primary function of all concepts-gender concepts included-is to represent the world, but Haslanger's engineering account of 'woman' fails to adequately represent the world because, by her own admission, it doesn't include all women in the extension of the concept 'woman.' I argue that this objection fails because the primary function of gender concepts-and social kind concepts in general-is not (merely) to represent the world, but rather to shape it. I finish by considering the consequences for "conceptual engineering" in philosophy more generally. While Haslanger's account may escape Simion's objection, other appeals to conceptual engineering might not fair so well.

Organisation(en)

Institut für Philosophie

Journal

Logos & Episteme

Band

9

Seiten

335-341

Anzahl der Seiten

7

ISSN

2069-0533

DOI

https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20189325

Publikationsdatum

2018

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

603113 Philosophie

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Philosophy

Link zum Portal

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/e03c22a2-7a06-4262-83cc-2a8e7276038e