Waiting for divine intervention: Timing of uncertainty resolution influences self-serving exploitation of uncertainty in other-regarding preferences
- Autor(en)
- Barna Bakó, Linda Dezsö, Stephan Dickert, Erich Kirchler
- Abstrakt
When revealing social preferences (for instance, in a dictator game, wherein selfish and social preferences are at odds), people tend to form self-serving beliefs about the other person's outcome if it involves uncertainty. This research examines situations in which uncertainty is resolved after the allocation choice was made. At the same time, findings on charitable giving document that the average donation is greater when the uncertainty of the victim’s identity has been resolved prior to choice as opposed to when it will be resolved after the choice. Combining these two lines of research, we present results of a dictator game in which we show that self-serving exploitation of uncertainty can be reduced and eliminated if the uncertainty is resolved prior to the dictator choice being made, rather than afterwards. We also show that this is because decision-makers form inflated beliefs about the expected value of a yet to happen outcome but not an already happened outcome.
- Organisation(en)
- Institut für Arbeits-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialpsychologie, Personalwesen und Frauenförderung
- Externe Organisation(en)
- Queen Mary University of London, Corvinus University of Budapest
- Publikationsdatum
- 06-2018
- ÖFOS 2012
- 502045 Verhaltensökonomie
- Link zum Portal
- https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/8c5ef16f-054d-4d5a-a6ba-01e1befc6500