Intergenerational transmission in regulated professions and the role of familism

Autor(en)
Omar Bamieh, Andrea Cintolesi
Abstrakt

We study to what extent familism accounts for the intergenerational transmission of jobs in regulated professions, and we examine the relevance of social norms to counteract familism. Before 2004, local courts graded the Italian bar exams for lawyers, and after 2004, exams were randomly assigned to external courts for grading. We measure family ties with the number of successful candidates sharing a family name and law firm address with an already registered lawyer. We find that the number of new entrants with a family tie drops by at least 10%, while the number of new lawyers does not change, showing that familism accounts for an important part of the intergenerational transmission in our setting. We do not find significant differences across gender, but our results are stronger in areas with weak social norms, although these areas have lower rents from licenses, suggesting that weak social norms rather than economic incentives are the main determinants of familism.

Organisation(en)
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Externe Organisation(en)
Banca d'Italia
Journal
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Band
192
Seiten
857-879
Anzahl der Seiten
23
ISSN
0167-2681
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.10.036
Publikationsdatum
12-2021
Peer-reviewed
Ja
ÖFOS 2012
502046 Volkswirtschaftspolitik
Schlagwörter
ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Link zum Portal
https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/6eade382-cd8d-4111-aa46-d8443e69ebbd