An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining

Autor(en)

Ada Kovaliukaite, Diogo Geraldes, Andrzej Baranski-Madrigal, James Tremewan

Abstrakt

Women are underrepresented in business, academic, and political decision-making bodies across the world. To investigate the causal effect of gender representation on multilateral negotiations, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads in a majoritarian, divide-the-dollar game. We document a robust gender gap in earnings driven largely by the exclusion of women from alliances rather than differential shares within alliances. Experiments with different subject pools show that distinct bargaining dynamics can underlie the same inequitable outcomes; gender-biased outcomes can be caused by outright discrimination, but they can also be driven by more complex dynamics related to differences in bargaining strategies. Although replacing the male with a female majority all but eliminates the gap in one pool, it has minimal effect in the other. These findings show that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to the gender gap we uncovered and highlight the importance of studying bargaining dynamics in detail.

Organisation(en)

Wiener Zentrum für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung

Externe Organisation(en)

University College Dublin, New York University Abu Dhabi, IÉSEG School of Management, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (WU)

Journal

Management Science

Band

70

Seiten

6622-6636

Anzahl der Seiten

15

ISSN

0025-1909

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01800

Publikationsdatum

10-2024

Peer-reviewed

Ja

ÖFOS 2012

502045 Verhaltensökonomie

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Strategy and Management, Management Science and Operations Research

Sustainable Development Goals

SDG 5 – Geschlechtergleichheit

Link zum Portal

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/31a79793-6648-48ca-9347-8b44bfadf0c9